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THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES:
CLOAKING AND DISROBING THE SUPREME COURT
IN CARRESE’S THE CLOAKING OF POWER
J. Scott Johnson†
The Cloaking of Power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Rise of Judicial
Activism. By Paul O. Carrese. University of Chicago Press, 2003. 312
pages. $39.00.
1

Paul Carrese argues in The Cloaking of Power that the roots of
today’s activist judiciary can be found in Montesquieu’s The Spirit of
2
Laws.
He does so by tracing Montesquieu’s influence on
Blackstone, Hamilton, Tocqueville, and Holmes. While Justice
Holmes is the chief villain of the book, the current Supreme Court
3
is also criticized, especially concerning the Roe v. Wade decision
4
and its subsequent modification in Casey. The problem for Carrese
seems to be the loss of any conception of natural law or right
reason as developed through the practice of common law judging.
This loss allows our current courts and their apologists to engage in
pure partisan politics. The big bugaboo in his eyes is, of course,
5
Bush v. Gore. The question really is whether this is the exception
that proves the rule or the best example of partisan rule itself.
Carrese prefers the former, as do I, but he seeks to ground his
argument in historical texts that simply can’t support what he is
trying to do. While there are many interesting insights offered in
this book, Carrese’s argument is ultimately unpersuasive as it twists
its texts in order to make points that cannot be reached with a
† Associate Professor of Political Science, Saint John’s University and the
College of Saint Benedict.
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2. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, CHARLES DE SECONDAT, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS
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straightforward reading.
Carrese’s book is organized into three parts. The first and
longest section discusses Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws. The
second part investigates Blackstone who cribbed much of
Montesquieu in his own evaluation of the English constitution.
The third and final part quickly reviews the influence of
Montesquieu on Hamilton, Tocqueville and Holmes, while carrying
out the more important part of making Carrese’s own argument
concerning the role of the judiciary in American politics. In this
review I will concentrate primarily on the first and third parts of
Carrese’s project.
The first problem with this book, and it is a common one in
political theory, is the lack of an adequate literature review.
Political theorists seem to believe that the field is not cumulative;
nothing can be learned from what went before; each interpretation
can and should reinterpret the text as if nothing before really
mattered and whatever is presented is a new finding. This is
troubling since it is often the case that previous scholars have
found insights that must be considered even if they are eventually
countered by a better interpretation of the available evidence.
In a brief two pages, Carrese dismisses most previous work,
often mentioning authors only in the footnotes. He ends his quick
tour by stating, “[s]till, most readers of The Spirit of Laws have not
found this distinctive conception of subtle judges and a judicialized
6
liberalism.” If this is true, and I think it is, though not for the
reasons given by Carrese, then it is incumbent upon the interpreter
to defend the method of discovery as well as its fruits. Why haven’t
most other readers found this novel insight of Carrese’s? I suggest
that they haven’t found it because it isn’t there.
Certainly Montesquieu makes brave claims for the consistency
and unity of design in The Spirit of Laws. But it is also well known
that Montesquieu worked on the manuscript over twenty years as
he was steadily going blind. Carrese quotes “the encyclopedist
d’Alembert: that one ‘must distinguish apparent disorder from real
7
disorder’ and that ‘voluntary obscurity is not obscurity.’ ” This
invites “an intricate, hardly obvious reading of his works” according
8
to Carrese, as well as a “reading between his lines.” Maybe, maybe
6.
7.
8.

Carrese, supra note 1, at 16.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 5, 16.
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not.
One possibility is that Montesquieu exaggerated his ability to
keep the book together. This possibility cannot be dismissed
altogether. A second possibility is that Montesquieu has invited us
to play a game of blind man’s bluff, hunting for clues when much
of the game is really in plain sight. This book was placed on the
Index of Forbidden Books in 1751, a mere three years after
publication, so the dangers of censorship and persecution cannot
be ignored. The final possibility, and a favorite of postmodern
critics, is to read the text as they choose to, finding what they will
regardless of what Montesquieu might or might not have intended.
This last possibility really shouldn’t be called interpretation and it
seems to be what Carrese occasionally engages in.
While Carrese’s approach is ideologically conservative, his
method has much in common with the distorted readings of some
postmoderns. His method, like that of Leo Strauss, notices the
9
number of citations to particular authors, the number of chapters
10
11
in a book, the changes in a turn of phrase, and from these
“clues” extracts dramatic conclusions. One quick example is on
page 100 where Carrese mentions an erroneous citation,
“ ‘Aristotle, Republic, Bk 5, ch. 3.’ In fact, this discussion occurs in
12
the corresponding book and chapter of the Politics and this is the
only time that Montesquieu misnames Aristotle’s main work of
political science. This may signal his attempt to replace Aristotle as
the teacher of true prudence . . . .” While he softens his inference
with a “may,” the evidence is still too slim to support that
conclusion. This may simply be the error of a man too blind to
proofread his own text. An earlier breathless conclusion drawn
from similarly meager support is patently absurd. Carrese writes,
“[n]ever in the work does Montesquieu declare legislative or
executive power so singularly essential to a liberal constitution, nor
13
so important for individual security or liberty.”
Imagine any
constitution without either a legislative or executive power, and the
naive absurdity should be obvious. In both cases, Carrese overstates

9. Id. at 55.
10. Id. at 85.
11. Id. at 87.
12. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (T.A. Sinclair trans., Trevor J. Saunders rev.,
Penguin Books 1992) (335).
13. Carrese, supra note 1, at 6 (emphasis added).
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the inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. I do not think
it is his method that is to blame.
While the method Carrese uses can be quite powerful in the
right hands, revealing things that a casual or quick reader might
miss, it is incumbent upon the practitioner of this method to be
doubly sure that he or she makes no obvious mistakes or the
method reflects back on its user and forces us to wonder whether
the mistake was intentional thus revealing a more secret purpose
instead of a simple accident. For example, Carrese quotes Locke
and writes, “[t]his by itself raises the prospect of revolution, in
which ‘[t]he People shall be Judge’ after all, but this puts everyone
14
back in the state of nature.” Here he simply misreads Locke. No
plausible interpretation of Locke can suppose that it is ever
possible to return to the state of nature. When the State fails, the
power reverts to the people as a community, not to them as
15
individuals. It is difficult to reconcile this and other small errors
made by Carrese with the weight Carrese puts on the mistakes of
Montesquieu.
Turning to the main theme of the book, Carrese writes that
“Montesquieuan constitutionalism reflects some debt to the
founder of political science and constitutionalism, Aristotle, who
simultaneously teaches the importance of natural right and the
soundness of dividing regimes into distinct functions—the
deliberative body, the offices and the law courts.” Though earlier,
like most everyone else including the Founders, Carrese gives
16
credit for the separation of powers to Montesquieu. I have often
wondered why more has not been made of this odd attribution. It
could be that many do not recognize the difference between
separating the powers of government and checking and balancing
those powers.
Carrese, in laying out Montesquieu’s distinctive approach to
the separation of powers, clearly shows how Montesquieu begins
with Locke’s tripartite division of legislative, federative, and
executive powers before splitting the executive power into
punishing crimes and judging disputes. Carrese notes how the
federative power then falls out of consideration in order to
14. Carrese, supra note 1, at 24.
15. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 123-24 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing 1980) (1690).
16. Carrese, supra note 1, at 260.
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redefine executive power and emphasize the importance of a
judicial power independent of both the punishing and the
legislative powers. He shows how “Montesquieu then refines his
formulation a final time, defining the powers as ‘that of making
laws, that of executing public resolutions, and that of judging the
17
crimes or the disputes of individuals.’ ” This is a great strength of
Carrese’s exposition.
What Carrese does not adequately emphasize is that the first
formulation is Locke’s, the second more appropriate for criticizing
the English constitution, while the third has the greatest
applicability toward reforming French absolutism, which for
Montesquieu was a deformed or despotic version of the ancient
French constitution. I think Carrese, given his method, could
clearly have emphasized the reasons for this tortured approach.
Despots do not take criticisms easily, so the true weight of the
attack must be lightened. Only a careful reading will notice the
shifts and understand their significance. A quick reader might
simply miss Montesquieu’s shifts or blame them on Montesquieu’s
own supposed carelessness.
The main point of these tripartite divisions is, as Carrese
correctly points out, the emphasis on the power of judging as
separate from that of legislative or executive power. One of
Montesquieu’s greatest complaints was of Louis XIV’s emasculation
of the parlements, and he did have to make those criticisms subtly.
While Carrese is correct to note Montesquieu’s insistence on the
18
rights of “enregistrement and remonstrance,” he does not adequately
discuss their diminishing historical importance. Montesquieu, by
referring often to Louis IX’s reign, was seeking to reverse history.
The parlements could slow the executive power in France where
there was no independent legislature, but that power was quickly
disappearing. There was a new need for an independent judiciary
in France, and England provided some possibilities. But
Montesquieu was also criticizing England’s prerogative courts,
which were abolished in 1641, and the role of the House of Lords.
In order for the courts to have any power to check the legislative or
executive powers, the courts must first be separated from each of
the other two.
Carrese quotes Montesquieu as follows:
17.
18.

Id. at 46.
Id. at 32.
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The power of judging ought not to be given to a
permanent senate, but ought to be exercised by persons
drawn from the body of the people (as at Athens), at
certain times of the year, in the manner prescribed by law,
to form a tribunal which only lasts as long as necessity
requires.
In this fashion, the power of judging, so terrible among
men, being attached neither to a certain estate, nor to a
certain profession, becomes, so to speak, invisible and
null. People do not continually have judges present to
their view; and they fear the magistracy, not the
19
magistrates.
From this, however, Carrese concludes that “Montesquieu
appears to use juries not only to cloak the judging power but also to
20
cloak professional judges.” The second part of his conclusion does
not follow from the text.
While the text clearly mentions juries, it explicitly rules out “a
certain profession,” thus professional judges are not cloaked, they
are excluded. This is also a critique of the parlements, which
belonged to a certain estate or class. Perhaps Carrese is trying to
make sense of how the institution of courts might survive without a
set of functionaries to organize and supervise the juries. What does
a judge do, if the jury is doing the judging? This is an important
question to which no answer is forthcoming. In this part of the
book Carrese seems more concerned with explaining Montesquieu’s quarrel with Machiavelli concerning the use of courts by
the people to promote their factional disputes with the nobility.
In order to limit the factional temptation “Montesquieu
indicates the first limits that should be placed on popular judging.
If ‘the tribunals ought not to be fixed,’ the judgments certainly
should be, so that ‘they are never anything but a precise text of the
21
law.’ ” Even while quoting Montesquieu’s main points, Caresse
seeks to evade them such that, by the end of this part of his book
Carrese claims, “[t]his obscure discussion at the close of The Spirit of
Laws suggests that a general principle of moderation or balance,
one avoiding small minded extremes, should be used to formulate

19.
20.
21.

Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 49-50.
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not strict judicial policies but judicial maxims or rules of thumb.
It is hard to reconcile Montesquieu’s call for a “precise text of the
law” with what Carrese endorses as “judicial maxims” or “rules of
thumb.” Montesquieu’s limits are far more precise than those of
Carrese. Indeed, it would seem more likely that activist judges
would prefer Carrese’s formulation to that of Montesquieu.
In the last few pages of this section Carrese makes much of
Montesquieu’s failure to cite Coke. Instead, “the only reference to
23
a common-law text or author” is to Littleton, Coke’s predecessor.
Here Carrese tries to equate what Coke and Littleton do with “the
kind of judicial depository advocated throughout” The Spirit of Laws.
Common-law textbooks are clearly not the kind of depository
Montesquieu preferred. The parlements did not convert the
common law decisions into code law, though they did provide an
independent record of monarchical decrees. That alone provided
a check on monarchical power. These texts of Coke and Littleton
reduce the multiform complexity of the common law into the kind
of maxims that Carrese prefers but not the specificity that
Montesquieu advocates. This confusion of the black letter
restatements with the detail of the common law is a mistake nonlawyers are particularly prone to make.
The conclusions to be drawn from part one are elaborated
more clearly in part three. Here again, as in part one, Carrese
makes unusual interpretive choices. When discussing Publius, the
“author” of the Federalist papers, Carrese only reluctantly
distinguishes Hamilton’s contributions from those of Madison and
Jay. Indeed, by interpreting them all as if they have but one author
he significantly distorts the differences among them. When
discussing Tocqueville, Carrese’s emphasis on a legal aristocracy
leaves entirely out of the discussion “How An Aristocracy May be
24
Created by Industry.” I also believe he overemphasizes the
influence of Holmes on legal realism, at the expense of Justice
Brandeis, Justice Cardozo, or Karl Llewellyn. It would be better to
describe Holmes as a legal positivist, even though the terms have
much in common.
Carrese is aware that “[t]he brief analyses of Hamilton,
22. Id. at 99.
23. Id. at 103.
24. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
George Lawerence trans., Harper Row 1969).
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Tocqueville, Holmes, and the late-twentieth-century Supreme
Court . . . are, if taken individually, inadequate treatments of
25
complicated and controversial topics.”
He hopes that taken
together they will allow him to raise questions about the legitimacy
of judicial review and the pressures of democratization that led to
“immoderate repudiations of natural right, a stable
26
constitutionalism, and the separation of powers.” Holmes is the
villain because “[h]is project to redefine law epitomizes . . .
philosophical and constitutional immoderation by claiming to
27
uncloak the real nature of politics and judging.” Here is the crux
of the issue: Is Carrese more concerned with the power of judging
or the fact that we now all know it is there? Given the multiple
references to cloaking, I believe he is more concerned with the
revelation of that power and the poor interpretation that many
have given to that revealed power. If the power of the Court to
decide the law is a power that is in some ways legislative, and it
always has been, then what limits can be put on that power? For
Carrese the only response to this uncloaking must be a return to a
natural law jurisprudence imposed on a democracy by an
aristocratic judiciary trained through an experienced application of
right reason that we call common law. I do not think Carrese can
adequately support that return.
Part of the problem is that Carrese does not adequately
understand the binding character of positive law that legislatures
make, regardless of natural law. Carrese seems to see this when he
writes that “for Holmes, law is the posited will of the dominant
28
forces of the community at a given moment.” This law is made by
legislatures and may trump the common law made by courts,
especially in a democratic system. When Carrese quotes Holmes’s
29
dissent in Jensen, “I recognize without hesitation that judges do
and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are
30
confined from molar to molecular motions,” he doesn’t consider
the full case, but rather Holmes’s correspondence with Laski. At
issue in the Jensen case was exactly the type of separation of powers,

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Carrese, supra note 1, at 181.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 240.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Carrese, supra note 1, at 239.
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here a states’ rights federalism to fill in by legislation what Congress
has not decided, that Carrese seems to support. The Court in a 5-4
decision, over Holmes’s dissent, invented a remedy to reverse a
state court decision requiring a railroad to pay a workmen’s
compensation claim. Holmes clearly stated later in his dissent:
The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the
sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi
sovereign that can be identified; . . . It always is the law of
some State, and if the district courts adopt the common
law of torts, . . . they thereby assume that a law not of
maritime origin and deriving its authority in that territory
only from some particular state of this union also governs
maritime torts in that territory,—and if the common law,
the statute law has at least equal force, as the discussion in
31
The Osceola assumes.
It strikes me as odd that Carrese does not realize that Holmes
could serve as his ally.
Instead he criticizes Holmes by introducing a “rule of thumb.”
He argues that “today’s judiciary should not attempt ‘statesmanlike’
adjudications, since in the wake of the Holmesean revolution these
most likely would be made without regard to the Constitution’s
32
fundamental principles.”
In support of this maxim he cites
Lincoln’s “principled but prudent opposition to the constitutional
33
authority of the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision” and later his
own opposition to the “statesmanlike” adjudication in the abortion
34
35
decisions, Roe and Casey. Clearly Dred Scott was a dread spot on
our constitutional history (and only the second time judicial review
was used to strike down an act of Congress). While I tend to
support the outcome of Roe, I agree that this, too, was an act of
judicial statesmanship and not proper judicial decision-making.
On the other hand, Carrese would do well to remember that
36
Holmes dissented in Lochner, a key precedent for Roe and Casey,
and was a fundamental critic of “substantive” due process. As
Justice Holmes wrote in that dissent,
I think that the word “liberty,” in the 14th Amendment, is
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Carrese, supra note 1, at 228.
Id.
Id. at 245.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome
of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational
and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they
have been understood by the traditions of our people and
37
our law.
The Great Dissenter was dissenting against one of the very
things that concern Carrese: unbridled judicial power.
Carrese does not find an ally in Scalia’s dissent from Casey
either, and for some of the same reasons that he rejects Holmes.
Carrese condemns Scalia because he “adheres to such traditional
legal authorities simply from a democratic skepticism about any
38
others.” For Carrese, “[t]he severing of reason from tradition, of
the rational use of precedent from the customary character of the
39
law, explains why the Casey plurality has failed . . . .” He goes on
to argue, “[a] historicist notion of judicial statesmanship prescribes
an isolated, autonomous individual, while the positivist alternative
lacks the deeper reasoning to counter th[is] pragmatic
40
individualism.” Carrese’s attack on Holmes, Scalia and especially
Rawls is part and parcel of what is really an attack on liberalism
itself. Liberalism, as we have come to know it, suffers from “a
modern skepticism leading us to eschew any meaning or order in
nature independent of the human will, any reality to the traditional
41
distinctions regarding what is higher or virtuous in human life.”
Carrese prefers a “blend of natural rights and a traditional legal
prudence . . . for counteracting the slide toward modern nihilism
42
and individualism.” For this he needs “a genuine moral realism
43
rooted in the reality of nature.”
Carrese never specifies exactly what the reality of nature might
be or what a genuine moral realism might require. Certainly his
approach to natural law is not the modern reliance on reason, but
it appears to be the more robust kind of Aristotle. It would be
appropriate to remind ourselves that Aristotle thought men were
superior to women “by nature” and that there were “slaves by
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 65 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Carrese, supra note 1, at 248.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id. at 259.
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nature.” I hope this is not the reality of nature that Carrese prefers.
Arguments from nature can ossify habit and prejudice rather than
determining what is really essential to the human condition. That
is why opponents of the older versions of natural law remain
skeptical and sadly why those who accept things as “natural” cease
to argue about the truth of their assumptions.
Carrese seems to be assuming that a quasi-aristocracy is the
44
natural place for a judicial power and he does so by deferring to
authority rather than truly making an independent assessment of
what nature might require.
A comparison between Holmes and either Hamilton or
Tocqueville indicates that it is the classic common-law
element in the framers’ jurisprudence, and not solely the
Montesquieuan conception of judging, that provides this
ennobling, quasi-aristocratic character to the original
American conception of judicial power.
Holmes
45
repudiates exactly this moral element of American law.
It is hard for those with republican sentiments to accept
nobility as a moral element in America.
Carrese begins and ends with an attack on activist judges as
serving the ends of liberalism while destroying the separation of
46
His case is made more
powers and majoritarian democracy.
clearly when “statesmanlike” judges attempt to enforce what they
believe a majority would like instead of exercising judicial power
interstitially, as Holmes recommended. Carrese’s discussion of the
Federalist fails to discuss the key contribution of Madison in
47
Federalist 10, where he discusses the dangers of majority factions.
If there is any last redoubt for the rights of individuals, it must be in
the words of the Constitution and then in statutes interpreted by
judges sometimes against the precedents of common law.
Gay marriage, while not discussed by Carrese, is an obvious
example. Common law and long-standing tradition seem to
preclude the state’s recognition of same sex unions. Yet the plain
48
wording of the Constitution’s equal protection clause, and other
44. Id. at 209.
45. Id. at 209-10 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 1, 261.
47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Michael Kammen ed., Penguin
Books 1986).
48. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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49

phrases in the Massachusetts and California constitutions, are
being interpreted to trump those traditional understandings. Is it
activist judges or just plain meanings seen differently? Some will
say these unions are against nature, but the proper response must
be that the unwritten natural law was not enacted by the people
and it is far harder to understand an unwritten law than a written
one.
Clearly there are unintended consequences of every
enactment, but this does not reduce the force of those enactments.
Common law judicial decision-making is essentially a process of
determining what all the consequences of a particular enactment
might be on a case-by-case basis, then allowing the legislative power
in a separate body to respond or clarify if they so choose. It is not
an attempt to replace the legislative judgment.
The movement to enact a constitutional amendment
discriminating against homosexual unions is a more powerful
response to current social changes than the southern states’ laws
against interracial marriages that were ultimately struck down in
50
1967. Both actions were activist attempts by supposed majorities
to work their will against identifiable minorities. One was stopped
and the first has yet to play itself out. If the attempt to add positive
discrimination against a particular group into the Constitution
succeeds, it will be a spot on our constitutional history every bit as
bleak as Dred Scott.
The Cloaking of Power is a useful book. I cannot recommend the
book as an excellent study of any of the authors it purports to
interpret.
However, it defends and decloaks an important
ideological current in American legal thought by outlining some of
its origins in suspicious readings of Montesquieu, one-third of the
authorship of the Federalist, and pieces of Tocqueville. It outlines
an aristocratic approach to the judicial power completely in line
with the inegalitarian anti-homosexual movement now active. For
that reason, those who prefer a more liberal, limited, and positivist
approach to judicial power will find much to argue with here.
49. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
“Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage, a
person who enters into an intimate, exclusive union with another of the same sex
is arbitrarily deprived of membership in one of our community’s most rewarding
and cherished institutions. That exclusion is incompatible with the constitutional
principles of respect for individual autonomy and equality under law. Id. at 949 (emphasis
added).
50. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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